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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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2 October 1968

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
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Poland: High-level shifts in military personnel  
are under way. (Page 5)



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\*Poland: A number of shifts involving high-ranking officers are under way in the Defense Ministry.

25X1 [redacted] some 25 new generals will soon be appointed, presumably replacing others who are judged unreliable and who are leaving the ministry for "less exposed positions."

There are rumors in military circles that the changes are in part related to the transfer of some Polish officers to Warsaw Pact staff jobs being created in Moscow. The shifts may also be motivated, however, by the party's reported lack of confidence in the army, which is being charged in central committee circles not only with failure to follow the party's line but also with criticism of the party leadership.

A conference of the party organizations of the Polish general staff was held in late September. The meeting, in preparation for next month's party congress, dealt with strengthening the "cohesion" of party-military organizations and called for further purges of "antisocialist" elements.

One of the standing issues that has caused friction between the party and military leaders has been the subordination of Polish interests to Soviet policies. There have been reports of disaffection on the part of key military men since the Arab-Israeli War in June 1967. Several generals who apparently questioned Gomulka's strong support for Moscow's pro-Arab policies were removed. Other military leaders objected to the violent repression of student demonstrations last March. Still others may have objected to the Warsaw Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia, and to Poland's ignominious role in it.

In any case, the party leadership must be concerned over persistent rumors of poor morale among troops of the four Polish divisions in Czechoslovakia.

The politicians may believe that the disaffection among the troops is not being combated effectively by the officer corps. The first deputy chief of the army's main political directorate found it necessary last month to talk with the Polish occupation troops.

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\*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

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
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